Introduction: Between Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer and Hybridization of Productive Models in the International Automobile Industry

What drives the development and diffusion of 'best practice' in manufacturing industry? One simple, powerful, and recurrent explanation is that the imperatives of markets and technology narrowly determine the range of viable organizations and strategies. Firms have to adapt to the pressing demands of the external environment or fail. 1 In recent years, these notions have taken on a new dimension. The rise of 'globalization' and the accelerated integration of national economies resulting from the increased mobility of financial and physical capital, it is argued, mean that there are fewer and fewer protective cushions for firms to hide behind. Firms must meet global standards or pay the penalty. 2 Nowhere have these arguments been more strongly made than in relation to the rise of 'lean production' in the international automobile industry. The leading protagonists of this view, for example, have claimed that 'in the end . . . lean production will supplant both mass production and the remaining outposts of craft production in all areas of industrial endeavor to become the standard global production system of the twenty-first century'. 3

As we shall see, these views have not gone unchallenged. The dimensions and pace of convergence have been questioned, and the continuing importance of nation states has been noted, while other authors have emphasized the weight of national contexts or 'societal effects', the feasibility of alternative paths, or the evolutionary effects of unpredictability in the external environment. In short, the limits of convergence have been increasingly explored.

This book has two main aims in relation to these issues. First, it presents detailed research on the actual practice of the transfer and adaptation of productive models in the international automobile industry, focusing on attempts at the international transfer of 'Fordist' systems in the early and mid-twentieth century, and on the transfer of Japanese or 'lean production' systems in the late twentieth century. Secondly, it contributes to theoretical discussions about the transfer, adaptation, or convergence of productive models. 4 In particular, it argues that direct transplantation or imitation of productive models is rarely feasible or even desirable. Systems cannot be transferred without being significantly reshaped. Instead, it focuses on the process of 'hybridization', the complex interaction of productive models with national and societal effects. Hybridization, it is argued, is inevitable. But this should be seen not simply as a process of compromise and retreat but also as an important dynamic of innovation and learning...

Making Toyota in America: Evidence from the Kentucky Transplant, 1986-1994

INTRODUCTION
Toyota is a mysterious company. On the one hand, it is praised internationally for its outstanding manufacturing performance, and there is little doubt that Toyota was the model of 'lean production' when the term was coined by Womack et al. ( 1990). A lean producer, the book claimed, uses less of everything compared with mass producers--less labour, less time, less space, less inventory, less rework, and less defects. It seems that Toyota has realized manufacturing Utopia. On the other hand, Toyota never seems to escape scepticism. Something has to give, the reasoning goes, in order to outperform so many companies that have worked so hard for so long. Had Toyota's high performance originated from observable and agreeable sources such as automation, there would not have been much room for such reasoning. However, Toyota cites more mundane sources for its success, such as eliminating waste from workers' jobs and coordinating the flow of parts from suppliers. Since these sources are hard to observe and presumably available to other companies, the inevitable question arises: if Toyota in fact satisfies customers with lower cost and higher quality, is it only able to do so by sacrificing its workers and suppliers ( Jürgenset al., 1993)?

The coexistence of admiration and scepticism is a good indication of the state of confusion surrounding Toyota's manufacturing capability. Performance has been well demonstrated, but it is not at all clear what capabilities deliver such performance. For one thing, Toyota's capability is certainly complex and therefore not amenable to easy dissection by management analysts in search of simple formulas. For another, seeing is not quite believing as far as Toyota's Japanese operations go. Workers indeed build cars at a brisk pace and suppliers deliver parts rigorously on time. It may appear from a Western point of view that the company exercises an upper hand over submissive workers and suppliers. This impression often prevents anyone from looking further. Research in the past added to the confusion as much as it brought revelation. The problem here is that not all differences in practice are material to the difference in performance. Studies have highlighted where Toyota differs from others, but it is still uncertain whether a particular difference explains Toyota's superior manufacturing performance, or merely reflects historical accidents or cultural conventions without any relation to performance whatsoever. Yet, researchers...